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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure, appellant Raymond L. 
Balentine, will be referred to herein as "Ray"; appellee Corina L. Gehring will be referred 
to herein as the "Corina" and appellee Gregg Geliring will be referred to herein as 
"Gregg". Ray is the minor child's putative father. Corina is the minor child's mother. 
Gregg, at all material times herein, has been married to Corina. 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-2(3)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(Including standards of appellate review and supporting authority.) 
ISSUE ON APPEAL: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
DETERMINED THAT APPELLEES WERE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW UNDER: A) THE DOCTRINE 
OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL; B) RELEVANT UTAH CASE LAW; 
AND C) THE UTAH UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT? 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: Summary judgment shall be rendered if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah R. 
Civ. P. When a trial court's rulings are based upon a misunderstanding or misapplication 
of the law, where a correct one would have produced a different result, the party 
adversely affected is entitled to have the error rectified in a proper adjudication under a 
correct principal of law. Reed v. Avery, 616 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); Farris v. Jennings, 
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595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) and Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 519 (1912). 
Generally, a person's standing to request particular relief presents a question of law. See 
Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, \ 18, 82 P.3d 
1125. To the extent that factual findings inform the issue of standing, the appellate court 
reviews such factual findings made by the trial court with deference. Kearns-Tribune 
Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373-74 (Utah 1997). "Because of the important policy 
considerations involved in granting or denying standing, we closely review trial court 
determination of whether a given set of facts fits the legal requirements for standing, 
granting minimal discretion to the trial court." Id. The interpretation of a statute is a 
question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Provo City v. Cannon, 1999 UT App 
344, Tf 5, 994 P.2d 206 (quoting State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1994)). 
Preservation of Issue: The above stated issue was preserved for appeal by the 
following: Motion For Summary Judgment (R. 93-95); Verified Memorandum In Support 
Of Motion For Summary Judgment Re: Petitioner's Verified Petition To Establish 
Paternity And Child Custody (R. 101-119); Verified Memorandum In Opposition To 
Motion For Summary Judgment Re: Petitioner's Verified Petition To Establish Paternity 
And Child Custody (R. 129-149); Intervener's Response To Petitioner's Verified 
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For Summary Judgment Re: Petitioner's Verified 
Petition To Establish Paternity And Child Custody (R. 150-160); Motion Hearing Re: 
Motion For Summary Judgment (R. 312); Notice Of Objection To Recommendation (R. 
278-280); Order Denying Intervener's Motion for Summary (R. 284-286); Motion 
Hearing Re: Objection To Recommendation (R. 313); Findings Of Fact And Conclusions 
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01 Law On Interveners Motion foi Summary Judgment And Intervener ^nd 
Respondent's Objection To Recommendation (R 292-296); and Summan Judgment And 
Oulti ( )n * >b|ei ti HI 1 o Rcumimendanmi (\" ^ r - ? ( ^ ) 
STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION ARE DETERMINATET 
OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO TH E \PPF \L 
1 he ioliowmg statutes and iiile are detenninatr c of the appuil w ( 'iili.il 
iinpnitaiue to tin* apnral ! hese statues and rule are contained in the Addendum. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45g-204 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45g-602 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45g-607 
Rule 56(c) Utah R.Ch P 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature n>l (he 1 asc, 1 oui si 1 M 1 i m ci'tlm^s. liitl Disposition llrlow 
Tin1 underlying couise of proceedings m this matter is import to die e\aluation of 
this appeal. Initially, Ray, the putative father, filed his Verified Petition To Establish 
Paternity And ( lnld I ustody on April 25, 2(Mb I wo da\s laiu on LJUJI J ^m" 
Conna the mmoi < lnld ^ inothei, filed her own Verified Petition foi Deolaiation Of 
Paternity, Child Custody, Child Support \nd Visitation. Corina's action was 
consolidated into this matter. 
Online tli lii ,t piiit >t tlii. (ase, attorney Stephanie E. Sankey ("attorney 
Sankey") acted as primary counsel for Ra\ Vttorney Francis Palacios ("attorney 
Palacios") represented Corina. At the time this case was filed, the minor child was in 
Ray's custod\ Conna contested Ray's custody of the mmoi luld and tikd a Motion 
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For Temporary Restraining Order. Judge Sandra Peuler's minute entry concerning the 
hearing on the temporary restraining order, dated May 9, 2005, indicates, "Petitioner 
(Balentine) ordered to return child to respondent (Gehring). Petition has no legal rights 
to custody or visitation as paternity has not been established and the child is legally the 
child of respondent and her husband." 
Following Judge Peuler's ruling, on June 2, 2005 Corina filed a Verified Answer 
And Amended Petition For Child Custody And Parent Time. Notably, Corina's amended 
petition requests that certain requirements be fulfilled prior to Ray exercising parenting 
time with the minor child and further seeks that child support be paid by Ray. 
During July through late October, 2005 the parties entered into a Case 
Management Order and exchanged Initial Disclosures. Ray served his first set of written 
discovery on August 29, 2005. 
On October 21, 2005, Corina served her responses to Ray's written discovery 
requests. On that same date, attorney Palacios filed a Motion To Withdraw As Counsel 
Of Record. The order granting Palacios' withdrawal request was granted on October 23, 
2005. On October 26, 2005 Ray's counsel filed a Notice To Appear In Person Or 
Appoint Counsel. On November 15, 2005, Corina filed a Request For Extension Of 
Time To Appear With Counsel. On November 18, 2005 attorney Sankey filed a Notice 
Of Withdrawal Of Counsel Of Record and indicated attorney Brett D. Cragun would 
continue as counsel in the case. On December 13, 2006, Judge Anthony Quinn granted 
Corina an extension to December 31, 2005 to appoint counsel or appear in person. On 
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December 29, 2005 attorney Kellie F. Williams ("attorney Williams") entered her 
appearance in this matter on behalf of Gregg. 
On January 17, 2006 attorney Williams filed a Motion For Summary Judgment 
(regarding whether Ray had standing to pursue his paternity claim) and Verified Motion 
To Intervene. Ray opposed the Motion For Summary Judgment. The matter was set for 
hearing before Commissioner Michelle Blomquist on March 27, 2006. 
At the March 27, 2006 hearing, Ray stipulated to Gregg's intervention in this 
matter. After hearing argument from counsel, Commissioner Blomquist stated her 
recommendation that the Motion For Summary Judgment be denied. On April 6, 2006 
Corina, through attorney Williams, filed a Verified Motion to Dismiss Petition, Amended 
Petition For Declaration Of Paternity, Child Custody, Child Support, And Visitation. 
(Ray opposed this motion, however, the hearing on this motion was stricken as the result 
of the ultimate summary judgment disposition of this case.) Also on April 6, 2006, 
Corina and Gregg filed an objection to the recommendation of Commissioner Blomquist. 
On May 30, 2006, Judge Quinn heard argument on the Objection To 
Recommendation. After argument, the trial court determined that summary judgment 
was appropriate and Ray's petition was thereafter denied and dismissed in its entirety. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Corina and Gregg were married on April 30, 1999 in Salt Lake County, 
State Of Utah. (R. 102) 
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2. In early 2002, during a period when Gregg and Corina were separated, 
Corina was with her brother while participating in a drug rehabilitation program. At this 
time she met Ray. (R. 102, 130) 
3. During this period, Corina engaged in sexual relations with Ray and 
became pregnant. (R. 35, 102) Corina later moved back in with Gregg in an effort to 
reconcile their marriage. (R. 102) 
4. On December 13, 2002, Corina's child was born. (R. 102) 
5. From the time shortly after Corina's pregnancy to approximately October 
2003, Ray was generally unaware of Corina's whereabouts, although at one point the 
parties had agreed to amend the birth certificate to name Ray as the minor child's father. 
(R. 131) 
6. In October 2003, Corina, Gregg, Ray and Ray's wife met to discuss the 
situation. During the subsequent few weeks, the parties agreed that genetic testing to 
determine paternity would take place. (R. 131) 
7. Ray agreed to pay for the genetic testing. The testing established that Ray 
could not be excluded as being the minor child's biological father by any of the ten 
genetic marker systems that were analyzed in the testing. (R. 13, 131) 
8. In approximately January 2004, pursuant to an agreement between Ray and 
Corina, the minor child began spending alternate weekends with Ray. On some 
occasions, these weekend visits were extended and parenting time would take place from 
Thursday evenings to Tuesday evenings. (R. 131-132) 
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9. In February, 2004 Ray began paying, and Gregg and Corina accepted, child 
support for the benefit of the minor child. (R. 131) 
10. During a subsequent difficult time in the marriage of Corina and Gregg, 
Corina signed a notarized document dated January 13, 2005 which states: 
I Corina L. Gehring in sound state and mind give temporary custody of 
minor Child Brianna Renee Gehring to her biological father Raymond L. 
Balentine. This custody to be effective beginning Jan. 13, 2005 with no 
specific amount Of days, months. (R. 148) 
11. From January 2005 to the beginning of these proceedings, the minor child 
spent the vast majority of her time in Ray's custody and care. (R. 132) 
12. In early April 2005, Corina decided to terminate the custody she had given 
to Ray. In a handwritten and notarized statement, Corina stated as follows: 
I Corina L. Gehring in sound state and mind give complete termination of 
temporary custody of minor child Brianna Renee Gehring from her 
biological father Raymond L. Balentine. This custody was effective 
beinning January 13, 2005 with no specific amount of days or months. I 
choose, as her primary custody parent, to terminate this temporary custody 
as of today, April 8, 2005. (R. 149) 
13. Ray was concerned with Corina's situation and her ability to appropriately 
parent at the time Corina terminated the "temporary custody" she had provided to him. 
As such, Ray elected to initiate this proceeding. (R. 132) 
14. After Ray filed his action for paternity and child custody, Corina filed her 
own action for paternity and also sought establishment of parenting time and child 
support. (R. 33-42) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is not warranted in this matter. At the time summary 
judgment was granted there remained questions of material fact and appellees were not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The facts in this case establish that under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, 
appellees should have been precluded from asserting that appellant had no standing to file 
a petition for paternity. Moreover, the facts and legal principles in the Schoolcraft and 
Pearson decisions referred to by the trial court were not properly applied to the facts of 
this case. (The Schoolcraft and Pearson cases are contained in the Addendum.) 
The trial court misinterpreted specific provisions of the Utah Uniform Parentage 
Act and a correct interpretation of these provisions would properly preclude the granting 
of summary judgment in this matter as a matter of law. Moreover, the trial court 
dismissed Ray's claims for custody, even though no argument was made by appellees 
regarding this issue. For these reasons, the granting of summary judgment was not 
appropriate in this case, and that judgment should be reversed and the case should be 
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL ERRED WHEN IF FAILED TO DETERMINE THAT THE 
DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL PRECLUDED CORINA AND GREGG 
FROM CONTESTING RAY'S PATERNITY IN THIS CASE 
Utah courts recognize the doctrine of equitable estoppel in paternity cases. 
Pearson v. Pearson, 2006 UT App 128, 134 P.3d 173, fn. 11, (Utah Ct. App. 2006). See 
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also, Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Estoppel is an equitable 
doctrine which precludes parties from asserting their rights where their actions render it 
inequitable to allow them to assert those rights. Id. Estoppel requires proof of tliree 
elements: (1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a 
later-asserted claim; (2) the other party's reasonable action or inaction based upon the 
first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party 
that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate its statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act. Id. 
In this case, the following facts existed (or at the very least were contested) prior 
to the time Corina and Gregg asserted that Ray does not have standing to assert his 
parentage in this case: 
1) That Corina engaged in sexual relations with Ray during a 
time when Corina did not cohabitate with Gregg; 
2) That the parties met after the birth of the minor child and 
discussed amending the birth certificate to name Ray as the minor child's 
father; 
3) That the parties jointly agreed that genetic testing would take 
place to determine who the minor child's father is; 
4) That genetic testing essentially determined that Ray is minor 
child's father; 
5) That after genetic testing was completed, Ray spent continual 
and substantial time with the minor child with Corina *s permission; 
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6) That Corina and Gregg received and accepted child support 
for minor child's benefit from Ray; 
7) That when Corina again experienced marital problems, she 
singed a notarized document that provided custody of the minor child to 
Ray in his capacity as the minor child's biological father; 
8) That when Corina sought to terminate Ray's custody of the 
minor child, she again signed a handwritten, notarized document which 
stated Ray was the minor child's biological father; 
9) That after Ray initiated this action to determine paternity and 
child custody, Corina filed her own petition to determine paternity. 
Significantly, Corina's petition sought to have Ray meet certain 
requirements before spending parenting time with the minor child and 
requested that Ray pay child support; and 
10) That Corina responded to Ray's petition and participated in 
discovery in this case prior to raising issues of standing in this matter. 
The aforementioned facts clearly establish both Corina's and Gregg's position that 
Ray is not only the minor child's father, but that Ray has the duties and obligations to act 
as the minor's father. The actions of Gregg and Corina establish their belief that Ray has 
the responsibility to provide care, comfort and support for the minor child. Ray relied 
upon these facts in bringing this action and participating in his young daughter's life. Ray 
has been damaged by Corina's and Gregg's wholesale change of position. Given the 
unique facts of this case and the sudden shift of position in this matter, it was 
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fundamentally inequitable for the trial court to ignore the parties' prior actions and 
dealings which fully support Ray's status as this child's dad, and then find that Ray has 
no right or standing to be recognized as the minor's father. The trial court ignored the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel in this case, and erred when it failed to determine that 
Corina and Gregg should be estopped from contesting Ray's standing to assert a paternity 
action in this case. 
POINT II 
THE FACTORS SET FORTH IN THE SCHOOLCRAFT DECISION SHOULD 
NOT PRECLUDE RAY'S STANDING TO ASSERT A PATERNITY ACTION IN 
THIS MATTER 
After argument in this case, Commissioner Blomquist recommended that the 
Motion For Summary Judgment be denied on the basis that Ray did in fact have standing 
to assert his parentage claim under State in re J W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) 
(hereinafter referred to as "Schoolcraft"). The Schoolcraft decision indicates that 
"...whether individuals can challenge the presumption of legitimacy should not depend on 
their legal status alone, but on a case-by-case determination of whether [certain] policies 
would be undermined by permitting such a challenge." (emphasis added) The main 
"policies" referred to in Schoolcraft include "preserving the stability of the marriage and 
protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon their paternity." 
Shortly after Commissioner Blomquist entered her recommendation denying the 
Motion For Summary Judgment, this Court issued its decision in Pearson. The Pearson 
decision discusses the Schooler eft factors. Gregg and Corina filed an objection to 
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Commissioner Blomquist's recommendation citing the Pearson case. At the outset of the 
hearing on the objection to Commissioner Blomquist's recommendation, Judge Quinn 
indicated he did not believe under the facts of this case that Ray could overcome the "first 
prong of the Schoolcraft test." (R. 313) In essence, Judge Quinn held that because the 
minor child was born into an "intact marriage", Ray's challenge to paternity would 
impact the stability the stability of Gregg and Corina's marriage. 
Whether Ray's challenge to paternity could impact the stability of Gregg and 
Corina's marriage was, and still is, an open and material question of fact that should have 
precluded summary judgment. The record in this case unquestionably establishes that 
Corina engaged in a sexual relationship with Ray while she was married to Gregg. 
Moreover, Corina's filings with the trial court admittedly indicate that as recently as 
January 2005, Corina and Gregg were experiencing difficulty in their marriage. Like the 
situation in other cases cited in Schoolcraft, it is apparent the marriage between Gregg 
and Corina has already been shaken. While the trial court had an obligation to evaluate 
the first prong of the Schoolcraft test in relation to the facts of this case, the trial court 
should not have weighed this particular factor so heavily and determined Ray does not 
have standing simple because the minor child's mother was married. That fact in and of 
itself should not have been dispositive. 
The facts in Pearson, which the trial court apparently relied upon, are clearly 
different that those of this case. In Pearson it was determined that Thanos (the purported 
biological father who was seeking standing) "was unwilling to be known or recognized as 
the child's father and did not provide any monetary support toward [the minor child's] 
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parental care or birth costs." Moreover, Thanos had acquiesced in the presumed father's 
role as the minor child's father. Thanos only saw the minor child about half a dozen 
times during the first sixteen months of the minor's life and did not provide any of the 
aforementioned care or support for the minor during that period. Consequently, while 
this Court presumed that Thanos had standing at the minor's birth to assert parentage, this 
Court determined Thanos later lost his standing because of his conduct. This Court 
stated, Lt[W]e cannot see how Thanos9s ability to challenge [the minor child's] paternity 
remained necessary after he voluntarily absented himself from [the minor child's] life." 
Id. 
In this case, however, Ray has fully and completely sought to be a part of his 
daughter's life. He paid for genetic testing. He agreed to pay child support. He has 
provided for his daughter's care on a frequent and consistent basis whenever he has had 
the opportunity. 
According to Schoolcraft, a determination regarding standing needs to be made on 
a case-by-case basis. There are significant and relevant fact issues which remain at issue. 
Judge Quinn appears to have based his ruling solely on the fact that Gregg and Corina are 
married. Judge Quinn also stated, 'There's been adequate opportunity in this case to 
conduct discovery with respect to that issue, if it was thought to have been helpful." As 
the record indicates, however, due to the withdrawal of the primary attorneys in this 
matter, as well as the nature of the underlying proceedings, there was not a real chance 
for the discovery process to be completed. Ray was certainly not afforded the 
opportunity to fully present evidence on the Schoolcraft factors. 
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Given the unique facts of this case and the policy considerations involved, the trial 
court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis of the Schoolcraft and Pearson 
decisions. The Pearson decision, while discussing the impact a parentage challenge 
could have on a marriage, was more focused on whether the conduct of the person 
seeking standing was of sufficient magnitude to cause that person to lose standing. Ray's 
course of dealing in this matter establishes he desire to provide care, comfort and support 
for his child. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment by too heavily weighing 
the fact that Gregg and Corina are married. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT DOES NOT PRECLUDE 
RAY'S STANDING IN THIS CASE 
In May 2005, the Utah Uniform Parentage Act ("Act") became effective. This 
chapter of Utah statute applies to determinations of parentage in the State of Utah. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45g-103(l). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-201(2) provides in relevant part: 
The father-child relationship is established between a man and a child by: 
(a) an unrebutted presumption of the man's paternity under Section §78-
45g-204 ... [or] ... (c) an adjudication of the man's paternity; 
Pursuant to § 78-45g-2045 Gregg is the presumed father of the minor child. While 
this provision of the Act does create a presumption that Gregg is the minor's (legal) 
father, it is also clear that this statutory presumption is rebuttable. Section 78-45-204(2) 
states, "A presumption of paternity established under this section may only be rebutted in 
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accordance with Section 78-45g-607." Section 78-45g-602, which is also relevant to this 
case, also references Section 78-45g-607. Section 78-45g-602 states provides: 
78-45g-602. Standing to maintain proceeding. 
Subject to Part 3, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity, and Sections 
78-45g-607 and 78-45g-609, a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be 
maintained by: 
(1) the child; 
(2) the mother of the child; 
(3) a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated; 
(4) the support-enforcement agency or other governmental agency 
authorized by other law; 
(5) an authorized adoption agency or licensed child-placing agency; 
(6) a representative authorized by law to act for an individual who 
would otherwise be entitled to maintain a proceeding but who is deceased, 
incapacitated, or a minor; or 
(7) an intended parent under Part 8, Gestational Agreement. 
Consequently, these statutes plainly establish that the presumption that Gregg is 
the minor's father is rebuttable. Further, it is clear that subject to any limitation set forth 
in Section 78-45-607, Ray may maintain a proceeding to adjudicate parentage. 
It is with regard to the purpose and scope of § 78-45g-607 where there is 
disagreement. The trial court determined § 78-45g-607 limits those who have standing to 
bring a parentage action to only a mother or presumed father. Appellant, on the other 
hand, reads § 78-45g-607 to limit the time in which a mother or presumed father may 
bring a parentage action, but does not expressly provide a limitation on the others listed 
on § 78-45g-602. 
At the objection hearing relating to Commissioner Blomquisfs recommendation, 
Judge Quinn stated as follows: 
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Let me start with the statute. The statue says, in essence, that the 
presumption of paternity can only be rebutted as set forth in - - I think it's 
607, part 607 of the statute, and maybe - - I don't have it in front of me. 
That may not be right. That section of the statute only refers to the rebuttal 
of the presumption by the mother and the father. 
It's my inclination to take the legislature at its word. Where there's no 
mention of anybody else having the authority or the ability to challenge the 
presumption, I think "only" means only; and the absence of any reference 
to the biological father or the declared father or anybody else having the 
ability at any time to rebut the presumption, I have to take as being an 
intentional omission. 
Judge Quinn in essence indicates that the word "only" is an important word 
contained in the relevant statutes. Such is not the case. The word "only" is not part of § 
78-45-602. Section 78-45g-607 reads as follows (with the relevant portion on bold 
print): 
78-45g-607. Limitation — Child having presumed father. 
(1) Paternity of a child conceived or born during a marriage with a 
presumed father as described in Subsection 78-45g-204(l)(a), (b)5 or 
(c), may be raised by the presumed father or the mother at any time 
prior to filing an action for divorce or in the pleadings at the time of 
the divorce of the parents. 
(a) If the issue is raised prior to the adjudication, genetic testing may be 
ordered by the tribunal in accordance with Section 78-45g-608. Failure of 
the mother of the child to appear for testing may result in an order allowing 
a motherless calculation of paternity. Failure of the mother to make the 
child available may not result in a determination that the presumed father is 
not the father, but shall allow for appropriate proceedings to compel the 
cooperation of the mother. If the question of paternity has been raised in the 
pleadings in a divorce and the tribunal addresses the issue and enters an 
order, the parties are estopped from raising the issue again, and the order of 
the tribunal may not be challenged on the basis of material mistake of fact. 
(b) If the presumed father seeks to rebut the presumption of paternity, 
then denial of a motion seeking an order for genetic testing or a decision to 
disregard genetic test results shall be based on a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
(c) If the mother seeks to rebut the presumption of paternity, the mother 
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has the burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would be 
in the best interests of the child to disestablish the parent-child relationship. 
(2) For the presumption outside of marriage described in Subsection 78-
45g-204(l)(d), the presumption may be rebutted at any time if the tribunal 
determines that the presumed father and the mother of the child neither 
cohabited nor engaged in sexual intercourse with each other during the 
probable time of conception. 
(3) The presumption may be rebutted by: 
(a) genetic test results that exclude the presumed father; 
(b) genetic test results that rebuttably identify another man as the father 
in accordance with Section 78-45g-505; 
(c) evidence that the presumed father and the mother of the child neither 
cohabited nor engaged in sexual intercourse with each other during the 
probable time of conception; or 
(d) an adjudication under this part. 
(4) There is no presumption to rebut if the presumed father was properly 
served and there has been a final adjudication of the issue. 
Apparently it is true that the legislative history indicates Section 78-45g-607 was 
originally introduced with the word "only" before the language "be raised by the 
presumed father or the mother/' however, the word "only" was removed prior to the 
section becoming enacted: 
(1) Paternity of a child conceived or born during a marriage with a 
presumed father as described in Subsection 78-45g-204 (l)(a), (b), or (c), 
may H. [ &nty ] .H be raised by the presumed father or the mother at any 
time prior to filing an action for divorce or in the pleadings at the time of 
the divorce of the parents. 
{See Amendment to S.B. 014, dated February 16, 2005.) 
Appellant argues that a correct reading Section 78-45g-607 simply limits the time 
in which a presumed father or mother may raise paternity issues. Pursuant to the statute, 
a mother or presumed father can raise the issue prior to a divorce proceeding or in the 
pleadings at the time of a divorce. With the exception of a mother and presumed father, 
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Section 78-45g-607, on its face, does not limit those listed in 78~45g-602 from initiating a 
paternity action. 
Appellant's reading of the statute simply makes more sense than alternative 
interpretations. By requiring a mother or presumed father to raise any paternity issues 
prior to or as part of a divorce proceeding, a mother or presumed father is precluded from 
later using paternity issues to impact child support and parenting time. For example, 
without this statutory provision, a presumed father may be ordered to pay child support as 
part of a divorce proceeding. If the presumed father becomes unhappy with the situation, 
he might later claim that he is not the biological father of the child and assert a paternity 
challenge in order to attempt to relieve himself of the support obligation. Likewise, a 
mother who becomes disgruntled with a parenting time arrangement ordered by a trial 
court may raise issues of paternity in an attempt to augment or preclude parenting time. 
It is clear the Utah Uniform Parentage Act is modeled after and is substantially 
similar to the Uniform Parentage Act. One area where the Utah statute differs from the 
text of the model act relates to § 78-45g-607. Section 607 of the model act (and the 
comment related thereto) states as follows: 
§ 607. Limitation: Child Having Presumed Father. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a proceeding brought by 
a presumed father, the mother, or another individual to adjudicate the 
parentage of a child having a presumed father must be commenced not later 
than two years after the birth of the child. 
(b) A proceeding seeking to disprove the father-child relationship between 
a child and the child's presumed father may be maintained at any time if the 
court determines that: 
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(1) the presumed father and the mother of the child neither cohabited 
nor engaged in sexual intercourse with each other during the 
probable time of conception; and 
(2) the presumed father never openly held out the child as his own. 
COMMENT 
2006 Electronic Pocket Part Update 
Source: UPA (1973) § 6; cf UPC (1993) § 2-114(c). 
This section deals with difficult issues. First, it establishes the right of a 
mother or a presumed marital or nonmarital father to challenge the 
presumption of his paternity established by § 204. Second, it clarifies the 
right of a third-party male to claim paternity of a child who has an existing 
presumed father. 
UPA (1973) § 6(a) places a [five-year] limitation on the time in which a 
proceeding may be brought "for the purpose of declaring the non-existence 
of the father and child relationship presumed under [the Act]." At that time, 
the comment noted that: 
"Ten states have denied standing to a man claiming to be the father when 
the mother was married to another at the time of the child's birth. In some 
of these states, even though a presumed father may seek to rebut his 
presumed paternity, a third-party male will be denied standing to raise that 
same issue." 
As of the year 2000, the right of an "outsider" to claim paternity of a child 
born to a married woman varies considerably among the states. Thirty-tliree 
states allow a man alleging himself to be the father of a child with a 
presumed father to rebut the marital presumption. Some states have granted 
this right through legislation, while in other states case law has recognized 
the alleged father's right to rebut the presumption and establish his 
paternity. In some states, there is both statutory and common law support 
for the standing of a man alleging himself to be the father to assert his 
paternity of a child born to a married woman. Not that long ago, some 
states imposed an absolute bar on a man commencing a proceeding to 
establish his paternity if state law provides a statutory presumption of the 
paternity of another man. See Michael H v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
It is increasingly clear that those days are coming to an end. 
The new UPA attempts to establish a middle ground on these exceedingly 
complex issues. Subsection (a) establishes a two-year limitation for 
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rebutting the presumption of paternity established under § 204 if the mother 
and presumed father were cohabiting at the time of conception. The 
presumption of paternity may be attacked by the mother, the presumed 
father, or a third-party male during this limited period; thereafter the 
presumption is immune from attack by any of those individuals except as 
provided in subsection (b). 
The reverse fact situation is also clear; a presumption of paternity may be 
challenged at any time if the mother and the presumed father were not 
cohabiting and did not engage in sexual intercourse at the probable time of 
conception and the presumed father never openly held out the child as his 
own. 
Under the fact circumstances described in subsection (b), nonpaternity of 
the presumed father is generally assumed by all the parties as a practical 
matter. It is inappropriate for the law to assume a presumption known by all 
those concerned to be untrue. 
The issue in this case is one of standing. Pursuant to § 78-45g-602(3), "a man 
whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated55 has standing to maintain a paternity 
action unless standing is limited by § 78-45g-607. Section 78-45g-607 only limits a 
"presumed father55 from maintaining an action if a divorce has occurred. Ray is not the 
presumed father, so § 78-45g-607 has no impact on his standing to maintain this action. 
As such, summary judgment was not appropriate. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DISPOSED OF RAY'S PETITION 
FOR CUSTODY BASED ON THE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT 
The trial court not only dismissed Ray5s paternity claim, but also dismissed his 
claim for custody. Significantly, it was never expressly argued to the trial court that Ray 
did not have standing to assert a custody claim. 
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The Schoolcraft decision makes clear that, "Certain people because of their 
relationship to a child, are at least entitled to standing to seek a determination as to 
whether it would be in the best interests of the child for them to have custody." 
The Schoolcraft court later continued: 
Equally important is the person's status or relationship to the 
child. Even if a person has no legal duty of support to a child, that 
person's legal relationship to the child may suffice for standing. 
Examples include close relatives, who, although lacking a duty of 
support, may be perceived by reason of that relationship to have the 
child's best interests at heart. Such a relationship would seem to 
warrant a grant of standing. 
The Schoolcraft court concluded by stating: 
There is no reason to narrowly restrict participation in custodial proceeding. 
Indeed, our case and the legislature's pronouncements indicate that the 
interests of children are best served when those interested in the children 
are permitted to assert that interest. The question of who should have 
custody of the child is too important to exclude participants on narrowly 
drawn technical grounds, as did the court of appeals. Those who have legal 
or personal connections with the child should not be precluded from being 
heard on best interests. 
Based upon the reasoning set forth in Schoolcraft and the facts of this case, there is 
no reason why Ray's claim for custody should have been dismissed by way of summary 
judgment. At the very least, there are questions of material fact relating to what is in the 
minor child's best interests. As such, summary judgment on is the issue of custody was 
not appropriate. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant requests that this Court reverse the summary 
judgment decision of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <5Q day of October, 2006. 
BfeOf. Cragun 
Attorney For Petitioner/Appellant 
22 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant 
was served upon the following individuals by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to 
said individuals at the following address this 3^ day of October, 2006. 
Corina Gehring 
332 West Harvard Drive 
Midvale,UT 84047 
Gregg Gehring 
332 West Harvard Drive 
Midvale,UT 84047 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45g-204. Presumption of paternity. 
(1) A man is presumed to be the father of a child if: 
(a) he and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is 
bom during the marriage; 
(b) he and the mother of the child were married to each other and the child is 
born within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, 
declaration of invalidity, or divorce, or after a decree of separation; 
(c) before the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child married each 
other in apparent compliance with law, even if the attempted marriage is or could 
be declared invalid, and the child is born during the invalid marriage or within 300 
days after its termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce 
or after a decree of separation; or 
(d) after the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child married each other 
in apparent compliance with law, whether or not the marriage is, or could be 
declared, invalid, he voluntarily asserted his paternity of the child, and there is no 
other presumptive father of the child, and: 
(i) the assertion is in a record filed with the Office of Vital Records; 
(ii) he agreed to be and is named as the child's father on the child's birth 
certificate; or 
(iii) he promised in a record to support the child as his own. 
(2) A presumption of paternity established under this section may only be 
rebutted in accordance with Section 78-45g-607. 
(3) If a child has an adjudicated father, the results of genetic testing are 
inadmissable to challenge paternity except as set forth in Section 78-45g-607. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45g-602. Standing to maintain proceeding. 
Subject to Part 3, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity, and Sections 78~45g-607 
and 78-45g-609, a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be maintained by: 
(1) the child; 
(2) the mother of the child; 
(3) a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated; 
(4) the support-enforcement agency or other governmental agency authorized 
by other law; 
(5) an authorized adoption agency or licensed child-placing agency; 
(6) a representative authorized by law to act for an individual who would 
otherwise be entitled to maintain a proceeding but who is deceased, incapacitated, 
or a minor; or 
(7) an intended parent under Part 8, Gestational Agreement. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45g-607. Limitation — Child having presumed 
father. 
(1) Paternity of a child conceived or born during a marriage with a presumed 
father as described in Subsection 78-45g-204(l)(a), (b), or (c), may be raised by 
the presumed father or the mother at any time prior to filing an action for divorce 
or in the pleadings at the time of the divorce of the parents. 
(a) If the issue is raised prior to the adjudication, genetic testing may be ordered 
by the tribunal in accordance with Section 78-45g-608. Failure of the mother of 
the child to appear for testing may result in an order allowing a motherless 
calculation of paternity. Failure of the mother to make the child available may not 
result in a determination that the presumed father is not the father, but shall allow 
for appropriate proceedings to compel the cooperation of the mother. If the 
question of paternity has been raised in the pleadings in a divorce and the tribunal 
addresses the issue and enters an order, the parties are estopped from raising the 
issue again, and the order of the tribunal may not be challenged on the basis of 
material mistake of fact. 
(b) If the presumed father seeks to rebut the presumption of paternity, then 
denial of a motion seeking an order for genetic testing or a decision to disregard 
genetic test results shall be based on a preponderance of the evidence. 
(c) If the mother seeks to rebut the presumption of paternity, the mother has the 
burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would be in the best 
interests of the child to disestablish the parent-child relationship. 
(2) For the presumption outside of marriage described in Subsection 78-45g-
204(1 )(d), the presumption may be rebutted at any time if the tribunal determines 
that the presumed father and the mother of the child neither cohabited nor engaged 
in sexual intercourse with each other during the probable time of conception. 
(3) The presumption may be rebutted by: 
(a) genetic test results that exclude the presumed father; 
(b) genetic test results that rebuttably identify another man as the father in 
accordance with Section 78-45g-505; 
(c) evidence that the presumed father and the mother of the child neither 
cohabited nor engaged in sexual intercourse with each other during the probable 
time of conception; or 
(d) an adjudication under this part. 
(4) There is no presumption to rebut if the presumed father was properly served 
and there has been a final adjudication of the issue. 
Rule 56(c) U. R. Civ. P. 
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A 
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the 
amount of damages. 
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volunteer obviously exculpatory evidence 
and evidence that is "so clearly support-
ive of a claim of innocence that it gives 
the prosecution notice of a duty to pro-
duce." 427 U.S. at 107, 96 S.Ct. at 2399. 
Specifically, the Court held that due pro-
cess is violated if the undisclosed evi-
dence, had it been disclosed, would have 
created a reasonable doubt as to defen-
dant's guilt.26 
On the second day of the initial trial, 
October 13, 1988, the court granted Traf-
ny's motion for a mistrial based upon the 
fact that the prosecution had failed to sup-
ply Trafny with lab reports that compared 
samples of hair, blood, and saliva taken 
from Trafny with samples of hair and se-
men taken from the clothing worn by the 
victim on the night of the alleged rape. 
The semen sample matched Trafny's blood 
type exactly; however, the laboratory was 
unable to match the pubic hair samples 
taken from the victim's clothing with Traf-
ny's hair samples. 
In the instant case, there is no indication 
that the prosecution intentionally or in bad 
faith withheld any of the lab reports in 
order to cause a mistrial, thereby improv-
ing the chances of conviction in a new trial. 
Trafny claims that the failure to supply the 
lab reports cannot be explained as a simple 
oversight. Nevertheless, we perceive no 
prejudice toward Trafny because of the 
prosecution's failure to supply the lab re-
ports. Indeed, Trafny did not attempt to 
suppress the evidence in the inculpatory 
portion of the lab reports in the November 
trial. In addition, he stipulated to the ad-
mission of the exhibits underlying the lab 
reports. 
Trafny has failed to demonstrate, either 
by evidence or by argument, how he was 
prejudiced by the failure of the prosecutor 
to disclose the exculpatory evidence before 
the October trial. The record does not 
reflect bad faith on the part of the prosecu-
tion by intentionally withholding exculpato-
ry evidence in an effort to provoke a mis-
trial in order to gain some tactical advan-
26. Jarrell, 608 P.2d at 224; see also State v. 
Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 850 (Utah 1988); State v. 
tage. Indeed, the prosecution attempted to 
introduce both the inculpatory and exculpa-
tory evidence at the October trial and met 
with no objection when the evidence was 
introduced at the November trial. We con-
clude that the prosecution did not exercise 
bad faith under the facts of this case and 
that Trafny was not placed in double jeop-
ardy because of the retrial. 
We have duly considered Trafny's other 
claims and find them to be without merit. 
Affirmed. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., and DURHAM 
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
STATE of Utah in the Interest of 
J.W.F., a person under eighteen 
years of age. 
Petition of Winfield D. 
SCHOOLCRAFT. 
No. 890001. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 19, 1990. 
Husband petitioned for custody of 
child born to wife during marriage. Child's 
guardian ad litem filed petition seeking de-
termination that husband had no rights in 
child. The Second District Court, Weber 
County, Robert L. Newey, J., found that 
husband was not biological father of child 
and thus had no right to custody. Hus-
band appealed. The Court of Appeals af-
firmed, and husband petitioned for writ of 
certiorari. The Supreme Court, Zimmer-
man, J., held that: (1) child's guardian ad 
litem had standing to challenge presump-
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985). 
STATE IN INTEREST OF J.W.F. 
Cite as 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) 
tion of legitimacy of child born during mar- biological father of child 
riage; (2) evidence was sufficient to rebut 
presumption of husband's paternity beyond 
reasonable doubt; and (3) husband had 
standing, as child's stepparent, to seek cus-
tody of child. 
Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded. 
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and child was 
partly of African ancestry while husband 
and wife were both of Anglo-Saxon ances-
try. U.C.A.1953, 78-25-18, 78-25-21. 
1. Children Out-of-Wedlock <s=>34 
Generally, class of persons permitted 
to challenge presumption of husband's pa-
ternity of child born during marriage 
should be limited. 
2. Children Out-of-Wedlock <s=>34 
Whether certain persons can challenge 
presumption of legitimacy of child born 
during marriage should depend not on their 
legal status alone, but on a case-by-case 
determination of whether paramount con-
siderations of preserving stability of mar-
riage and protecting children from disrup-
tive and unnecessary attacks upon their 
paternity would be undermined by permit-
ting challenge. 
3. Children Out-of-Wedlock <s=34 
Child's guardian ad litem had standing 
to challenge presumption of legitimacy of 
child born during marriage, where child's 
custody as opposed to his mere technical 
legitimacy was at issue, stability of mar-
riage had previously been shaken, and child 
never had relationship with any alleged 
father, and :hus had no expectations as to 
who his father was. 
4. Witnesses; @=>57 
Husband's concession on appeal that 
he was not child's biological father could 
not be relied upon to rebut presumption of 
legitimacy of child born during marriage, 
since such reliance would contravene "Lord 
Mansfield's rule," which precludes husband 
and wife from saying after marriage that 
offspring is spurious. 
5. Children Out-of-Wedlock <s=43 
Evidence was sufficient to support con-
clusion that presumption of husband's pa-
ternity of child born during marriage was 
rebutted beyond reasonable doubt, where 
blood tests indicated that husband was not 
6. Infants <s=>l 9.3(1) 
Parent and Child ®»2(7), 15 
Fact that person is not child's natural 
or legal parent does not mean that person 
must stand as total stranger to child where 
custody is concerned; certain people, be-
cause of their relationship to child, are at 
least entitled to standing to seek determi-
nation as to whether it would be in best 
interests of child for them to have custody. 
7. Infants <£=>19.3(1) 
Legally enforceable financial obli-
gations that nonparent has toward child 
may suffice to give nonparent standing to 
seek custody; however, grant of standing 
cannot be determined solely by reference to 
legal support obligations. 
8. Parent and Child <s=>14 
Stepparent, regardless of whether he 
or she stands in loco parentis to child, is 
to be treated as relative of child and is 
entitled to hearing to determine whether it 
would be in best interests of child to grant 
stepparent visitation rights, since.' statute 
requires stepparent to support spouse's 
children. U.C.A.1953, 78-45-4.1. 
9. Children Out-of-Wedlock <s=>20 
Parent and Child <s=>14 
Husband had standing to seek custody 
of child born into his marriage whe was not 
his biological offspring, since husband was 
child's stepparent, and husband had legal 
obligation of support prior to dissolution of 
marriage. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5(4), 30-5-2, 
78-45-2(14), 78-4.5-4.1. 
Richard W. Jones, Ogden, for petitioner. 
Martin W. Custen, Jane A. Marquardt, 
Ogden, for J.W.F. 
R. Paul Van Dam, Sandra Sjogren, Paul 
M. Tinker, Diane Wilkins, Salt La.ke City, 
for State of Utah. 
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ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Winfield Schoolcraft seeks review of a 
decision of the court of appeals which held 
that the juvenile court acted correctly when 
it (i) determined that he has no parental 
rights in a child born to his wife during 
their marriage because he is not the biolog-
ical father of the child and (ii) declined to 
hold a hearing to determine whether it 
would be in the best interests of the child, 
J.W.F., to place him in Schoolcraft's custo-
dy. We reverse the court of appeals' deci-
sion insofar as it indicates that Schoolcraft 
has no standing to petition for custody of 
J.W.F. and remand to the trial court for a 
hearing to determine whether it would be 
in the best interests of J.W.F. for School-
craft to have custody. 
Winfield and Linda Schoolcraft were 
married on October 6, 1984. They lived 
together for approximately eight months 
after their marriage. The record is unclear 
as to the exact date on which Linda left 
Winfield, but it was seven months to one 
year prior to her giving birth to a son, 
J.W.F., in Utah on November 5, 1985. Lin-
da abandoned J.W.F. on or about December 
5, 1985. 
A petition was filed by the State in the 
juvenile court on December 13, 1985, alleg-
ing neglect and abandonment by Michael 
Ford, the alleged natural father, and Linda 
Schoolcraft, the mother. The court ap-
pointed a lawyer, Jane Marquardt, as 
guardian ad litem on December 24, 1985. 
On February 19, 1986, the court found 
J.W.F. to be neglected and abandoned and 
placed him in the custody of the State 
Division of Family Services, where he has 
been ever since. 
Winfield, who is still technically married 
to Linda, was living in California and was 
unaware of the pregnancy. He found out 
about J.W.F.'s birth in August of 1986, 
when he learned of the neglect and aban-
donment petition that had been filed by 
that state in juvenile court in 1985. J.W.F. 
was about nine months old at the time. 
Winfield then promptly filed a petition for 
custody in juvenile court on August 28, 
1986, alleging that he was the presumed 
father because he was married to Linda 
and was living with her at the time of 
conception. 
A petition for permanent termination of 
the parental rights of Michael Ford and 
Linda Schoolcraft was filed on September 
5, 1986, and on December 16, 1986, the 
guardian ad litem filed another petition, 
alleging that Winfield Schoolcraft had no 
legal rights to J.W.F. This petition, seek-
ing a determination that Winfield School-
craft had no rights in J.W.F., was based on 
an allegation by the guardian ad litem that 
Winfield was not the biological father of 
J.W.F. or, alternatively, that he was an 
unfit parent or had abandoned the child. 
After a hearing held on the two petitions, 
the court entered an order permanently 
depriving Michael Ford and Linda School-
craft of their parental rights. Both Win-
field Schoolcraft's petition for custody and 
the guardian ad litem's petition to termi-
nate Winfield's legal rights were continued 
to February 10, 1987. 
On February 10th, the trial court entered 
a memorandum decision finding that Win-
field Schoolcraft was not the biological fa-
ther of J.W.F. and concluding that he had 
no right to custody. In essence, because 
Schoolcraft was not the child's natural fa-
ther, the trial court denied Schoolcraft 
standing to assert a claim that it was in the 
child's best interests that he have custody. 
The court continued J.W.F.'s placement in 
the Utah State Division of Family Services 
for the purpose of finding suitable adoptive 
parents. Nothing in the record indicates 
that anyone is waiting to adopt J.W.F. at 
this time. The court of appeals affirmed 
the trial court's decision. We granted cer-
tiorari to review the court of appeals' deci-
sion. 
The central question before us is what 
rights, including custodial rights, a hus-
band has in a child born into his marriage 
who is not his biological offspring. Before 
addressing this question, several prelimi-
nary issues must be dealt with. 
First, the court of appeals held that the 
trial court properly permitted the guardian 
ad litem to challenge the presumption that 
a child born during a marriage is the hus-
band's natural child, relying on our decision 
STATE IN INTEREST OF J.W.F. 
Cite a« 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990) 
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in Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106, 107 (Utah 
1986), and Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah 2d 163, 
164-66, 340 P.2d 761, 762-63 (1959). The 
court of appeals reasoned that the guardi-
an is the representative of the child and the 
child is an indispensible party to the pro-
ceeding with independent interests to as-
sert. In re J.W.F., 763 P.2d 1217, 1221 
(Utah Ct.App.1988). Schoolcraft attacks 
this ruling. He argues that in order to 
preserve the sanctity of the marriage rela-
tionship, only the wife and the husband 
should be permitted to challenge the legiti-
macy of a child born into their marriage. 
If Schoolcraft is correct, then the trial 
court erred in permitting the guardian ad 
litem to challenge Schoolcraft's paternity 
and Schoolcraft is entitled to a legal pre-
sumption that he is J.W.F.'s father. 
[1,2] We find the court of appeals' 
analysis on this point to be too mechanistic 
and, consequently, is insufficiently sensi-
tive to the legitimate policy considerations 
Schoolcraft raises. However, we find 
Schoolcraft's approach similarly flawed. 
We agree that, as a general matter, the 
class of persons permitted to challenge the 
presumption of paternity should be limited, 
as he argues, but we reject the notion that 
the legal status of the prospective challeng-
er is the only relevant factor, as the court 
of appeals held. In determining who can 
challenge the presumption of legitimacy, a 
paramount consideration should be preserv-
ing the stability of the marriage and pro-
tecting children from disruptive and unnec-
essary attacks upon their paternity. See 
Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 395, 518 
P.2d 687, 689 (1974); Holder v. Holder, 9 
Utah 2d at 165, 340 P.2d at 763. This leads 
us to conclude that whether individuals can 
challenge the presumption of legitimacy 
should depend not on their legal status 
alone, but on a case-by-case determination 
1. Three Utah cases dealing with standing to 
challenge a child's legitimacy arc consistent 
with this approach. In Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 
106 (Utah 1986), Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 
(Utah 1982), and Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 
518 P.2d 687 (1974), the court allowed both the 
husband and the wife to challenge the presump-
tion of legitimacy, but in each of these cases, no 
reason existed to deny them standing because 
of whether the above-stated policies would 
be undermined by permitting the chal-
lenge.1 
[3] Applying these criteria to the 
present case, we reach the same :*esult as 
the court of appeals, albeit for different 
reasons. The guardian ad litem was repre-
senting the child, one not disinterested in 
the issue, because his custody, rather than 
his mere technical legitimacy, is at issue. 
Moreover, allowing the State or J.W.F. to 
challenge the presumption of legitimacy is 
not inconsistent with the relevant policy 
considerations. The stability of .;he mar-
riage between W.infield and Lind^ School-
craft was shaken long ago, and their mar-
riage is one in name only. Similarly, J.W. 
F.'s expectations as to who his lather is 
cannot be shaken by permitting a challenge 
to the presumption of legitimacy. The 
child has never had a relationship with 
Schoolcraft, Michael Ford, or even his 
mother, so he has no expectations as to 
who his father is. Having considered the 
legal status of the challenger and the rele-
vant policies that bear on the ques.tion, we 
conclude that the guardian ad litem was 
properly granted standing to challenge the 
presumption of legitimacy in this case. 
A second claim Schoolcraft raises is that 
the court of appeals improperly found the 
presumption of legitimacy to have been 
rebutted in this case. In Utah, 'the pre-
sumption of legitimacy will prevail unless 
the contrary is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt" Holder, 9 Utah 2d at 166, 340 
P.2d at 763. And, consistent with the his-
torically strong policies that underlie that, 
presumption, the form of proof admissible 
to rebut the presumption is limited. One of 
these limits that is part of our common law 
is "Lord Mansfield's rule." 2 As stated by 
this court, the rule is that "spouses them-
selves may not give testimony which would 
the stability of their marriage had already been 
shaken. 
2. Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 9-3 Eng.Re-
print 1257 (1777), wherein Lord Mansfield said: 
"[I]t is a rule founded in decency, morality, and 
policy that they [husband and wife] s.iould not 
be permitted to say after marriage that the off-
spring is spurious." 
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tend to ^legitimatize the child." Lopes, 30 
Utah 2d at 395, 518 P.2d at 689. u[T]he 
proof of such facts where necessary [must] 
come from other sources." Id. at 396, 518 
P.2d at 689. 
In Utah, the legislature has not abrogat-
ed Lord Mansfield's rule, but has specified 
that certain nontraditional evidence is capa-
ble of conclusively rebutting the presump-
tion of legitimacy. In Teece v. Teece, 715 
P.2d 106, 107 (Utah 1986), the court ob-
served that Lord Mansfield's rule has been 
substantially eroded by the enactment of 
section 78-25-18 of the code, which ex-
pressly mandates that courts utilize blood 
tests to assist in making a determination of 
paternity. Section 78-25-18 provides: "In 
any civil action or in bastardy proceedings 
in which the parentage of a person is a 
relevant fact, the court shall order the child 
and alleged parents to submit to blood 
tests." Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-18 (1987). 
Section 78-25-21 states: "The results of 
the [blood] tests shall be received in evi-
dence where the conclusion of all examin-
ers, as disclosed by the tests, is that the 
alleged father is not the actual father of 
the child, and the question of paternity 
shall be so resolved." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-25-21 (1987 & Supp.1990). 
The trial court found that it was scien-
tifically impossible for Schoolcraft to be 
J.W.F.'s father based on blood tests and 
testimony by Dr. Charles DeWitt regarding 
the results of the blood tests. This is con-
sistent with sections 78-25-18 and 78-25-
21. The court also relied on the fact that 
J.W.F. is partly of African ancestry while 
Winfield and Linda Schoolcraft are both of 
Anglo-Saxon ancestry. 
[4, 5] The court of appeals, however, af-
firmed the trial court's paternity finding on 
alternate grounds, i.e., Schoolcraft's con-
cession on appeal that he is not the biologi-
cal father of J.W.F. This was error be-
cause in relying on Schoolcraft's conces-
sion, the court relied on evidence that con-
travenes Lord Mansfield's rule.3 This does 
3. See Note, J. W.F. v. Schoolcraft: The Husband's 
Rights to His Wife's Illegitimate Child Under 
Utah Law, 1989 B.Y.U. L.Rev. 955, for a reflec-
not mean that the presumption of legitima-
cy was not effectively rebutted, however. 
We conclude that the evidence before the 
trial court was sufficient to support its 
conclusion that the presumption of paterni-
ty was rebutted beyond a reasonable doubt. 
We therefore affirm that portion of the 
court of appeals' ruling for the reasons 
given by the trial court. 
Having found that the guardian ad litem 
had standing to raise the issue and that the 
presumption of paternity was successfully 
rebutted, we next consider the question of 
whether Schoolcraft has any protectable 
custodial interest with respect to J.W.F., a 
child not biologically his, born to his wife 
during their marriage. Schoolcraft argues 
that he is J.W.F.'s legal father because of 
his relationship with Linda. Therefore, his 
parental rights, including his right to custo-
dy, cannot be terminated without a show-
ing of unfitness. The court of appeals 
rejected this argument. It stated that once 
the presumption that a child bom during a 
marriage is the husband's child is rebutted, 
the husband is not the child's legal father. 
In such a circumstance, the court of ap-
peals reasoned, the husband has no finan-
cial obligation of support toward the child 
and therefore has no rights with respect to 
the child, including custodial rights. In re 
J.W.F., 763 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988). 
[6] Again, we find this analytical ap-
proach to be too mechanical. It may be 
that no one has the same rights toward a 
child as his or her parents. See Wilson v. 
Family Services Div., Region Two, 554 
P.2d 227, 230 (Utah 1976). However, the 
fact that a person is not a child's natural or 
legal parent does not mean that he or she 
must stand as a total stranger to the child 
where custody is concerned. Certain peo-
ple, because of their relationship to a child, 
are at least entitled to standing to seek a 
determination as to whether it would be in 
the best interests of the child for them to 
have custody. See id. 
tivc and instructive analysis of court of appeals' 
decision. 
[7] We conclude 
may justify granting a person standing to 
petition for custody of a child. As the 
court of appeals noted, the legally enforce-
able financial obligations that a person has 
toward a cliUd may suffice to give that 
person standing to seek custody. How-
ever, the grant of standing cannot be deter-
mined solely by reference to legal support 
obligations. Equally important is the per-
son's status or relationship to the child. 
Even if a person has no legal duty of 
support to a child, that person's legal rela-
tionship to the child may suffice for stand-
ing. Examples include close relatives, who, 
although lacking a duty of support, may be 
perceived by reason of that relationship to 
have the child's best interests at heart. 
Such a relationship would seem to v/arrant 
a grant of standing.4 
Our cases recognize the right of relatives 
other than parents to have standing to seek 
custody. In Wilson v. Family Services 
Division, Region Two, 554 P.2d 227 (Utah 
1976), a grandmother sought to restrain 
family services from placing her grand-
child, who was parentless, out for adoption 
until she could have a hearing on her own 
fitness as custodian and/or adoptive par-
ent. The court stated that while only par-
ents have vested rights to the custody of 
children, "next of kin, such as this grand-
mother, do have some dormant or inchoate 
right or interest in the custody and welfare 
of the children who become parentless, so 
that they may come forward and assert 
their claim." Wilson, 554 P.2d at 23L Ac-
4. In addition, it is conceivable that persons who 
are not related by blood or marriage, although 
not presumptively entitled to standing, could 
show that they had a relationship with the child 
that would warrant a grant of standing. Wc 
have no such situation before us today. 
5. The court in Gribble actually required that the 
stepparent si.and in loco parentis to the child 
before he would be granted a hearing. The 
court was inlerpreting Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 
(1953), as amended, which stated that, "visita-
tion rights of parenls, grandparents and other 
relatives shall take into consideration the wel-
fare of the child." The court said that in order 
for a stepparent to get visitation rights, he must, 
therefore, "si.and in the relationship of parent, 
grandparent, or other relative to this child." 
Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66. The court indicated 
that if Utah had a statutory provision obligating 
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that several factors cording to Wilson, inchoate rights entitle 
the relative to standing to such a hearing 
to determine custodial fitness. 
[8] A similar standing result obtained 
in a Utah divorce case, where this court 
held that a stepparent has the right to have 
a hearing to determine whether it is in the 
child's best interest to grant the stepparent 
visitation rights. Gribble v. Gribble, 583 
P.2d 64 (Utah 1978).5 In a custody case, 
we stated that in "custody matters, all 
things else being equal, near relatives 
should generally be given preference over 
non-relatives." In re Cooper, 17 Utah 2d 
296, 298, 410 P.2d 475, 476 (1966). And in 
yet another case, this court said that when 
determining the best interests of the child, 
a court may consider stepparent status. 
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 
(Utah 1982). 
[9] Utah statutes also support 'he right 
of relatives other than parents to standing 
to seek custody. The legislature has al-
lowed visitation rights for grandparents 
and other relatives. Section 30-5-2 of the 
code states that the court "may grant 
grandparents reasonable rights cf visita-
tion to grandchildren, if it is in the best 
interest of the grandchildren." Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-5-2 (1989). In addition, in di-
vorce decrees, when "determining visita-
tion rights of parents, grandparents, and 
other relatives, the court shall consider the 
welfare of the child." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-5(4) (1989). 
the stepparent to support the child, the steppar-
ent would have the same status as a p2rent or at 
least a relative and would be entitled to a hear-
ing on visitation. However, because no such 
statute existed at the time, the court required 
the stepparent to stand in loco parentis to the 
child. 
Utah has since enacted the Uniform Civil Lia-
bility for Support Act, section 78-45—^--1, which 
requires a stepparent to support his or her 
spouse's children. See Utah Cede Ann. 
§ 78-45-4.i (1987). According to the court's 
rationale, then, a stepparent, regardless of 
whether he or she .stands in loco parentis to the 
child, is to be treated as a relative of the child 
and is entitled to a hearing to determine wheth-
er it would be in the best interests of the child 
to grant the stepparent visitation rights. 
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Based on the foregoing, we conclude that 
Schoolcraft has standing to seek custody of 
J.W.F. First, he is J.W.F.'s stepparent. A 
stepparent is defined as "a person ceremo-
nially married to the child's natural or 
adoptive custodial parent who is not the 
child's natural or adoptive parent" Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45-2(14) (Supp.1990). Our 
case law indicates that the stepparent rela-
tionship Schoolcraft shares with J.W.F. is 
sufficient to entitle him to a hearing on 
custody. Hutchison, 649 P.2d at 41; see 
also Gribble, 583 P.2d at 64. 
In addition, Schoolcraft has the legal ob-
ligation of support that the court of ap-
peals thought indispensible to confer stand-
ing. The court of appeals was incorrect 
when it said that Schoolcraft has no legal 
obligation to J.W.F. As a stepparent, 
Schoolcraft has the obligation to "support a 
stepchild to the same extent that a natural 
. . . parent is required to support a child" 
so long as the stepparent's marriage to the 
natural parent continues. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-4.1 (1987). In light of School-
craft's stepparent relationship with J.W.F. 
and his legal support obligation, we find 
dual grounds for granting him standing to 
seek a hearing on whether it would be in 
the best interests of J.W.F. for him to have 
custody. 
There is no reason to narrowly restrict 
participation in custodial proceedings. In-
deed, our case law and the legislature's 
pronouncements indicate that the interests 
of the child are best served when those 
interested in the child are permitted to as-
sert that interest. The question of who 
should have custody of the child is too 
important to exclude participants on nar-
rowly drawn technical grounds, as did the 
court of appeals. Those who have legal or 
personal connections with the child should 
not be precluded from being heard on best 
interests. Of course, granting Schoolcraft 
a hearing on best interests does not mean 
that he has any presumption of entitlement 
of custody. The court still must determine 
what custody arrangement would serve the 
best interests of J.W.F. and act according-
ly. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-39(13)(b) 
(Supp.1990); accord Kishpaugh v. Kish-
paugh, 745 P.2d 1248, 1250-51 (Utah 1987); 
Hutchison, 649 P.2d at 40; Gribble, 583 
P.2d at 66. 
Schoolcraft raises two other issues: 
whether the presumption of paternity is 
irrebuttable and whether the juvenile court 
had jurisdiction to determine the issue of 
Schoolcraft's paternity. Both of these is-
sues have been addressed adequately by 
the court of appeals and will not be dis-
cussed here. In re J.W.F., 763 P.2d 1217, 
1219-22 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
The court of appeals' decision is reversed 
insofar as it states that Schoolcraft has no 
standing to petition for custody of J.W.F. 
We remand for a hearing to determine 
whether it would be in the best interest of 
J.W.F. for Schoolcraft to have custody. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., 
and STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., 
concur. 
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Before Judges GREENWOOD, ORME, 
and THORNE. 
OPINION 
THORNE, Judge: 
111 Kelly F. Pearson (Father) appeals from 
the trial court's supplemental decree of di-
vorce awarding joint legal custody of the 
minor child Z.P. to Kimberlee Y. Pearson 
(Mother) and intervenor Peter D. Thanos. 
We reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
U2 Father and Mother (collectively the 
Pearsons) married in 1992. In July 1997, the 
couple had their first child, N.P. In late 1998, 
Mother became pregnant again, and a second 
son, Z.P., was born in September 1999. 
113 Unbeknownst to Father, Mother had 
been involved in a romantic relationship with 
Thanos beginning sometime in 1996. Mother 
believed from early on in her pregnancy with 
Z.P. that Thanos was Z.P.'s biological father. 
She informed Father about her affair with 
Thanos and her belief about Z.P.'s paternity 
in March 1999. Despite Mother's infidelity, 
the Pearsons stayed together in an attempt 
to make their marriage work. Father 
agreed to raise Z.P. as his own, and Mother 
agreed to treat Father as Z.P.'s natural fa-
1. Thanos and Mother married in July 2002, 
shortly after the trial court granted Mother's 
request to bifurcate this case and entered a de-
cree of divorce between the Pearsons. Thanos 
and Mother subsequently had another child, 
daughter A4.T., whose custody is not implicated 
in this case. Also, despite the relationship be-
tween Mother and Thanos prior to N.P.'s birth, 
there is no suggestion that Thanos is N.P.'s bio-
logical father. 
ther. Z.P. was born in September 1999, and 
Father was named as Z.P.'s father on his 
birth certificate. Father and Mother raised 
Z.P. together until they separated in May 
2000. After separation and until the trial 
court's custody determination, the Pearsons 
voluntarily shared physical custody of Z.P. on 
a fifty-fifty basis.1 
114 Mother informed Thanos in January 
1999 that she believed him to be Z.P.'s bio-
logical father. Thanos was unwilling to be 
known or recognized as the child's father and 
did not provide any monetary support toward 
Z.P.'s prenatal care or birth costs. Thanos 
acquiesced in Father's role as Z.P.'s father. 
From birth until about January 2001, the 
first sixteen months of Z.P.'s life, Thanos did 
not provide any care or support for Z.P. and 
only saw him about half a dozen times. 
115 In December 2000, Father initiated 
divorce proceedings. Thanos moved to inter-
vene in the proceedings in January 2001, 
claiming that he was Z.P.'s biological father. 
Concurrently, Mother denied Father's pater-
nity of Z.P. in her answer and asked the trial 
court to declare that Father was not Z.P.'s 
biological father and that he had no rights of 
custody or visitation with Z.P. Father op-
posed both motions. The commissioner 
hearing the matter determined that Thanos 
lacked standing to contest Z.P.'s paternity. 
H 6 Thanos and Mother objected to the 
commissioner's standing decision. The trial 
court determined that the issue was gov-
erned by In re J.W.F., 799 P.2cl 710 (Utah 
1990), and that it needed additional informa-
tion to adequately address the policy consid-
erations set forth in that case. The trial 
court appointed Dr. Jill Sanders to provide 
the court with an independent Schoolcraft 
analysis.2 Sanders was to address the sec-
ond prong of the Schoolcraft test—whether 
permitting Thanos to seek paternity of Z.P. 
2. The term "Schoolcraft analysis" refers to the 
analysis set forth in In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 
(Utah 1990), and is named for the petitioner in 
that case. A Schoolcraft analysis determines a 
person's standing to challenge the presumption 
of legitimacy of a child born into a marriage, 
based primarily on two policy considerations: 
"preserving the stability of the marriage and 
protecting children from disruptive and unneces-
sary attacks upon their paternity." Id. at 713. 
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would be disruptive to Z.P.'s relationship 
with Father. She concluded that Thanos's 
presence in Z.P.'s life would not be inherent-
ly harmful to Z.P. or to Z.P.'s relationship 
with Father. 
11 7 After considering Sanders's conclusions 
and the Schoolcraft factors, the trial court 
granted Thanos's motion to intervene in No-
vember 2002. Addressing the first prong of 
the Schoolcraft analysis, the trial court con-
cluded that "the interest in preserving the 
stability of the [Pearsons'] marriage is not a 
consideration, due to the fact that there is no 
marriage to preserve. The stability was 
shattered when the parties separated and 
[Z.P.] was approximately nine months of 
age." As to the second prong, the court 
relied on Sanders's report to conclude that 
Thanos's challenge would not be "disruptive 
to Z.P. or an unnecessary attack on his pa-
ternity," and was "in the best interests of the 
child:7 
118 Father and Thanos both filed motions 
for summary judgment on the issue of Z.P.'s 
paternity. On May 8, 2003, the trial court 
granted Thanos's motion and denied Father's 
motion. The court's ruling determined Tha-
nos to be the natural, biological, and legal 
father of Z.P. 
19 The trial court issued its custody deci-
sion on May 11, 2004. Relying on its previous 
paternity determination, the court applied 
the parental presumption3 in favor of Moth-
er over Father as regards to Z.P. The trial 
court next determined that Thanos's parental 
presumption over Father had been rebutted, 
finding that for the first fifteen months of 
Z.P.'s life, Thanos "did not have a strong 
mutual bond" with Z.P., "did not demon-
strate a willingness to sacrifice his own inter-
ests and welfare for [Z.P.], and generally 
lacked the sympathy for and understanding 
of [Z.P.] that is characteristic of parents gen-
erally." See Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 
P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982) (listing factors for 
rebuttal of parental presumption). Accord-
ingly, the trial court placed Father and Tha-
nos on an equal footing and made its custody 
determination between them based solely on 
the best interests of Z.P. See id, 
v. PEARSON Utah 175 
13> (UtahApp. 2006) 
1110 The trial court granted Mother and 
Thanos joint legal custody and primary phys-
ical custody of Z.P. Mother and Father were 
granted joint legal custody of N.P., with pri-
mary physical custody in Mother. Father 
was granted "joint physical custody time" 
with N.P. and Z.P. The boys rotated between 
households on a weekly basis, resulting in an 
approximately equal amount of physical cus-
tody in each household. 
1111 Father appeals from the trial court's 
order allowing Thanos to intervene, its grant 
of summary judgment to Thanos on the issue 
of Z.P.'s paternity, and its custody determi-
nations to the extent that they relied on 
Thanos's paternity, and Father's non-paterni-
ty, of Z.P. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1-3] 1f 12 Father raises multiple issues 
on appeal, but our decision rests on the 
question of Thanos's standing to challenge 
Z.P.'s paternity. Generally, a person's 
standing to request particular relief presents 
a question of law. See Washington County 
Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 
UT 58,1! 18, 82 P.3d 1125. To the extent that 
factual findings inform the issue of standing, 
" '[w]e review such factual determinations 
made by a trial court with deference.'" Id. 
(quoting Reams-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkin-
son, 946 P.2d 372, 373-74 (Utah 1997)). 
" 'Because of the important policy consider-
ations involved in granting or denying stand-
ing, we closely review trial court determina-
tions of whether a given set of facts fits the 
legal requirements for standing, granting 
minimal discretion to the trial court.' " Id. 
(quoting Kearns-Trihune Corp., 946 P.2d at 
374). 
ANALYSIS 
I. The Schoolcraft Test 
U 13 The trial court determined that, as of 
November 2002, Thanos's challenge to Z.P.'s 
paternity would not affect the stability of the 
Pearsons' failed marriage and would not con-
stitute a disruptive and unnecessary attack 
3. The parental presumption is "the presumption 
in favor of awarding custody to a natural parent 
over a nonparent." Davis v. Davis, 2001 UT App 
225,11 1,29 P.3d 676. 
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on Z.P.'s paternity. See In re J.W.F., 799 
P.2d 710 (Utah 1990). Accordingly, the trial 
court found that Thanos had standing to 
challenge Z.P.'s paternity under the School-
craft test. 
[4] 1114 While we do not necessarily dis-
agree with the trial court's factual findings 
regarding the evolution of the relationships 
between Z.P. and the various parties, we 
determine that Thanos wholly lacked School-
craft, standing for a substantial period of time 
prior to his establishment of a relationship 
with Z.P. Even with the breakup of the Pear-
sons' marriage and the development of a 
relationship between Z.P. and Thanos, we 
cannot agree with the trial court's conclusion 
that Thanos satisfied the Schoolcraft test by 
November 2002. See id. at 713. According-
ly, we determine that the trial court erred in 
allowing Thanos to intervene in this action. 
A. Preservation of the Stability 
of Marriage 
U 15 The trial court found that "the first 
prong of the Schoolcraft analysis—relating to 
preserving the stability of the marriage—was 
not a consideration in this case, due to the 
fact that there was no marriage between 
[Father] and [Mother] to be preserved." Al-
though we recognize that a divorce termi-
nates any particular marriage and leaves 
nothing to preserve, we still disagree with 
the trial court's assumption that the first 
Schoolcraft prong loses all relevance upon 
divorce. Rather, we review the totality of 
the circumstances to determine whether a 
particular paternity challenge conflicts with 
the policy goal of preserving the stability of 
the marriage. 
U 16 The trial court apparently relied on In 
re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990), to reach 
its finding that preservation of marriage be-
comes moot upon the divorce or separation of 
the parties. In that case, Winfield and Linda 
Schoolcraft were married in 1984 and lived 
together for approximately eight months be-
fore Linda left Winfield. See id, at 712. In 
November 1985, some seven months to a 
year after the parties separated, Linda gave 
birth to J.W.F. Linda abandoned J.W.F. 
shortly thereafter, and the State initiated 
abandonment proceedings in December 1985. 
Upon learning of the child's birth and the 
abandonment proceedings in August 1986, 
Winfield filed a petition for custody of 
J.W.F., arguing that he was married to Lin-
da and living with her at the time of concep-
tion. At this time, the parties had still not 
obtained a formal divorce. See id. 
1117 The standing issue in In re J.W.F. 
was whether a guardian ad litem could chal-
lenge Winfield's custody petition and pre-
sumed paternity of J.W.F. The supreme 
court noted that "the class of persons permit-
ted to challenge the presumption of paternity 
should be limited." Id. at 713. The court 
then identified two "paramount consider-
ation^]" that must guide standing decisions 
in this context: "preserving the stability of 
the marriage and protecting children from 
disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon 
their paternity." Id. "[W]hether individuals 
can challenge the presumption of legitimacy 
should depend not on their legal status alone, 
but on a case-by-case determination of 
whether the above-stated policies would be 
undermined by permitting the challenge." 
Id. 
1118 In In re J.W.F., the parties' long 
separation prior to the birth of J.W.F. led 
the supreme court to conclude that "[t]he 
stability of the marriage between Winfield 
and Linda Schoolcraft was shaken long ago, 
and their marriage is one in name only." Id. 
The supreme court permitted a challenge to 
Winfield's paternity in these circumstances, 
deeming it "not inconsistent" with the stated 
policy of preserving the stability of the mar-
riage. Id. Notably, each of the three cases 
cited in Schoolcraft in support of this conclu-
sion also involved situations where divorce or 
separation occurred prior to or nearly con-
current with the birth of the child. See 
Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106, 106 (Utah 1986) 
("In May of 1981, plaintiff gave birth to a 
child. Soon thereafter, she filed this action 
for divorce."); Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640, 
641 (Utah 1982) (addressing first husband's 
attempt to deny paternity where child was 
conceived during his marriage but born into 
a subsequent marriage between mother and 
another man); Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 
393, 518 P.2d 687, 688 (1974) (addressing 
paternity question when child was yet "to be 
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born" at the time divorce pleadings were 
filed). 
1119 By contrast, the Pearsons made sub-
stantial efforts to maintain their marriage 
even though both parties knew midway 
through Z.P.'s gestation that Thanos was the 
likely biological father. The Pearsons dis-
agree about their intent regarding Father's 
relationship to Z.P. Father contends that 
both he and Mother agreed that Father 
would raise Z.P. as his child in all respects, 
while Mother asserts only that she agreed to 
stay and try to make the marriage work so 
long as Father would not punish her or Z.P. 
for her infidelity. The trial court made no 
findings on the issue, but did find that the 
Pearsons did not separate until Z.P. was 
approximately nine months old. 
1120 While not dispositive of Thanos's 
standing, we determine that the Pearsons' 
efforts to maintain their marriage after Z.P.'s 
birth remain relevant to the Schoolcraft anal-
ysis, even post-divorce. The question is not 
whether the Pearsons' marriage ultimately 
failed, but rather whether the potential of a 
challenge to Z.P.'s paternity would have un-
dermined the Pearsons' marriage while it 
was still in existence.4 Under Father's ver-
sion of events, the possibility of raising Z.P. 
as his own child without interference from 
Thanos was perhaps the central issue moti-
vating him to make the marriage work. 
While Mother's version is substantially dif-
ferent, even her recollection indicates the 
importance of the issue to Father, and her 
own willingness to make the marriage work. 
[5] 1121 In any event, the Pearsons 
stayed together in marriage for over a year 
after Father first became aware of Thanos's 
paternity of Z.P. The trial court erred in 
failing to recognize that the Pearsons' shared 
parentage of Z.P. represented a stabilizing 
force in their then-existing marriage, and 
that the potential of a paternity challenge 
4. We note that Thanos's paternity challenge 
arose entirely within the duration of the Pear-
sons' marriage, and that Thanos hied his motion 
to intervene concurrently with Mother's respon-
sive pleading in the Pearsons' divorce case, prior 
to the actual decree of divorce. 
5. We note that the public policy in favor of 
preserving the stability of marriage, always 
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would diminish that stabilizing effect. Thus, 
even after the Pearsons filed for divorce, 
Thanos's challenge to Z.P.'s paternity can be 
said to have had some undermining effect on 
the stability of the Pearsons' marriage within 
the meaning of Schoolcraft's public policy 
analysis.5 While the reality of the Pearsons' 
ultimate divorce may minimize the impor-
tance of the first Schoolcraft prong, we can-
not say on the facts of this case that it 
obviates that prong altogether. 
B. Protection of Children from 
Attacks on Paternity 
U22 The second, and in this case more 
problematic, policy consideration under the 
Schoolcraft test is "protecting children from 
disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon 
their paternity." In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 
713 (Utah 1990). There are crucial distinc-
tions between the Pearsons' case and In re 
J. W.F. that lead us to conclude that Thanos's 
challenge to Z.P.'s paternity is both disrup-
tive and unnecessary. 
1123 In In re J.W.F., J.W.F. was promptly 
abandoned by his mother at birth, his natural 
father apparently never sought or enjoyed 
any parental role whatsoever, and his moth-
er's husband, Winfield, never had custody of 
J.W.F. or a relationship with him. See id. at 
712-13. J.W.F. was a little more than one 
year old at the time of the initial standing 
dispute. Not surprisingly, the supreme 
court had no trouble in determining that 
allowing- J.W.F.'s guardian acl litem standing 
to litigate his paternity would not constitute 
an "unnecessary and disruptive attack[ ]" on 
J.W.F.'s paternity. Id. at 713. The court 
stated that "J.W.F.'s expectations as to who 
his father is cannot be shaken by permitting 
a challenge to the presumption of legitimacy. 
The child has never had a relationship with 
[Winfield] Schoolcraft, [or his biological fa-
strong in Utah, may be even stronger in light of 
Utah's enshrineinent of so-called traditional mar-
riage into its constitution in 2004. See Utah 
Const, art. I, § 29 (Supp.2005); but see Citizens 
foi Equal Prot. v. Bnuwig, 368 F.Supp.2d 980 
(D.Neb.2005) (declaring a similar state constitu-
tional amendment invalid on various grounds 
including free association and equal protection). 
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ther], or even his mother, so he has no 
expectations as to who his father is." Id. 
U24 Clearly, the present case does not 
involve a lack of paternal relationships. 
Rather, the trial court was presented with an 
undisputed and ongoing paternal relationship 
between Father and Z.P., as well as Thanos's 
evolving relationship with Z.P. as a stepfa-
ther, and as the father of one of Z.P.'s sib-
lings. In its November 2002 order granting 
Thanos's motion to intervene, the trial court 
explained its ultimate rationale on the unnec-
essary and disruptive prong: 
The court cannot find that granting Mr. 
Thanos the standing to intervene would be 
disruptive to [Z.P.] or an unnecessary at-
tack on his paternity. In this case, as 
indicated by Dr. Sanders in her report, 
Mr. Thanos has an established relationship 
with the child and there is nothing in the 
reports of Dr. Sanders that would suggest 
allowing Mr. Thanos to intervene would be 
adverse to the best interests of the child. 
The report of Dr. Sanders, to the contrary, 
indicates that it is in the best interests of 
the child to allow Mr. Thanos to inter-
vene^ 6] 
The November order also recognized that 
Father had "functioned as Z.P.'s father since 
his birth." 
1125 We have no reason to question the 
trial court's findings as they relate to the 
contents of Dr. Sanders's report or the exis-
tence of some relationship between Thanos 
and Z.P. in November 2002. However, de-
spite the paternal role that Thanos may 
eventually have attempted to take, the undis-
puted facts of the case are that Thanos had 
little interest or involvement in Z.P.'s life 
until he was approximately sixteen months of 
age. The trial court recognized as much in 
its October 2001 order initially denying Tha-
nos's motion to intervene: "Mr. Thanos was 
6. Dr. Sanders's May 13, 2002 report concluded 
that "[Groin a developmental and psychological 
perspective, [Z.Pj's functioning is not inherently 
disrupted by [Thanos's] involvement and [Tha-
nos's] relationship with [Z.P.] is necessary to 
[Z.P.]'s normal and positive development." Dr. 
Sanders's supplemental report of August 26, 
2002, further concluded that "[tjhere is no rea-
son to believe that further disruption to the rela-
tionship between [Z.P.] and [Father] is intrinsi-
completely absent from [Z.P.'s] first year of 
life, was absent for the first half of his second 
year of life, and has had incidental contact 
during the second half of the second year of 
[Z.P.'s] life." As a result of this intentional 
absence, Z.P. developed a paternal relation-
ship exclusively with Father over the first 
two years of his life, a relationship that both 
Father and Z.P. apparently continue to fos-
ter to the present. 
[6] 1126 The Schoolcraft analysis is not 
intended to protect children from all attacks 
on their paternity, but only those that are 
disruptive and unnecessary. See id. In 
evaluating the disruptiveness of a paternity 
challenge, the supreme court focused on the 
child's relationship with the existing father 
figure and the child's "expectations as to who 
his father is." Id. Here, the trial court found 
in its October 2001 order that Father was the 
"psychological father of [Z.P.]," that Z.P. had 
"become closely bonded with [Father]," and 
that those bonds were "critical." The trial 
court further found as a factual matter that 
to permit Thanos "to establish his paternity 
of [Z.P.] and to be introduced at this point as 
a father figure in [Z.P.'s] life would be imme-
diately disruptive to the child's stability." 
These facts leave little doubt that, at least as 
of October 2001, Thanos's paternity challenge 
would have been disruptive to Z.P.'s existing 
paternal relationship with Father and Z.P.'s 
expectations as to who his father was. 
% 27 We see nothing in the record to indi-
cate that the mere passage of time, or the 
integration of Thanos into Z.P.'s life as Moth-
er's husband, destroyed or even diminished 
Z.P.'s paternal relationship with Father or 
his expectations as to who his father was. 
To the contrary, Dr. Sanders's May 13, 2002 
report found that "[Z.P.] identifies [Father] 
as his father and their attachment is secure, 
strong and healthy." Her supplemental re-
cally linked to Mr. Thanos'[s] presence in [Z.P.]'s 
life." 
Mere involvement or presence in a child's life 
is a very different thing than a legal challenge to 
the child's paternity. Thus, we do not see Dr. 
Sanders's reports as being responsive to the 
Schoolcraft goal of "protecting [Z.P.] from dis-
ruptive and unnecessary attacks upon [his] pater-
nity." In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d at 713 (emphasis 
added). 
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port of August 26, 2002 confirmed that Z.P. 
and Father shared a "strong and positive 
parent-child attachment." Despite Dr. Sand-
ers's other conclusions regarding Z.P.'s best 
interests,7 her findings of a continuing pater-
nal relationship between Z.P. and Father 
should have been the central focus of the 
trial court's Schoolcraft analysis. 
11 28 In light of those findings, we cannot 
say that Thanos's attack on Z.P.'s paternity 
would not have been disruptive to Z.P.'s pa-
ternal relationship with Father and his ex-
pectations about whom his father was. The 
entire motivation for Thanos's attempt to 
intervene was to establish that he, rather 
than Father, was to fulfill the paternal role in 
Z.P.'s life. Whatever other effects Thanos's 
challenge might ultimately have on Z.P., his 
direct attack on Father's paternity of Z.P. 
certainly fails the Schoolcraft directive of 
avoiding disruption of existing paternal rela-
tionships. 
1129 We must also examine whether Tha-
nos's paternity challenge can be deemed 
"necessary." Id. In re J.W.F. did not pro-
vide guidance on distinguishing between nec-
essary and unnecessary paternity challenges, 
and the trial court did not expressly address 
the issue. We presume that, like the disrup-
tion element, the necessity element must be 
analyzed primarily from the child's perspec-
tive rather than from Father's or Thanos's. 
See id, (emphasizing a policy of "protecting 
children" and analyzing disruption from the 
child's perspective). We also assume, with-
out deciding, that Schoolcraft standing al-
ways exists at birth and can be lost only 
thereafter. Cf Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-
4.14(2) (2002) (establishing standards by 
which unmarried biological father can estab-
lish paternity so as to defeat adoption of his 
child by another at birth). 
11 30 Proceeding under these assumptions, 
we cannot see how Thanos's ability to chal-
lenge Z.P.'s paternity remained necessary 
7. We are aware that disregarding Dr. Sanders's 
conclusions regarding Z.P.'s best interests seems 
counterintuitive given the central role that the 
best interests standard plays in every case involv-
ing juveniles. Nevertheless, in the context of 
determining standing to contest paternity, the 
Schoolcraft test is the standard set by the su-
preme court to measure the child's best interests 
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after he voluntarily absented himself from 
Z.P.'s life. From Z.P.'s perspective, he had a 
father in Father from his earliest ability to 
form paternal bonds. Had the Pearson mar-
riage succeeded, Father would likely have 
remained Z.P.'s father in all regards 
throughout the foreseeable future. Dr. 
Sanders found that, even when the Pearsons' 
marriage failed, Z.P. continued to identify 
Father as his father and enjoy a strong 
paternal relationship with him. Thus, at the 
time of the trial court's intervention order, 
Z.P. had a father and was not in need of a 
different one. 
1131 We need not determine the exact 
point at which Thanos's paternity challenge 
became unnecessary for Schoolcraft pur-
poses. It is sufficient in this case to deter-
mine that there existed a period of many 
months during which Z.P. developed a strong 
paternal relationship with a loving and will-
ing presumed father. So long as that rela-
tionship continues, it cannot be said for 
Schoolcraft purposes that Z.P. has any par-
ticular need for his paternity to be estab-
lished in another man.s 
II 32 Looking at the circumstances of this 
case as a whole, we conclude that the trial 
court should have deemed Thanos's attack on 
Z.P.'s paternity both disruptive and unneces-
sary. Thanos's challenge to Z.P.'s presumed 
paternity became disruptive and unnecessary 
when he allowed Z.P. to form paternal bonds 
with Father, and will likely remain so, for 
Schoolcraft purposes, as long as those bonds 
continue. 
C. The Trial Court Erred in Allowing 
Thanos to Intervene 
11 33 In light of our conclusions regarding 
the application of the Schoolcraft factors to 
this case, we determine that Thanos lacks 
standing to challenge Z.P.'s paternity and 
that the trial court erred by allowing him to 
intervene in the Pearsons' divorce action. 
as those interests balance against the rights of 
others. 
8. This is not inconsistent with Dr. Sanders's as-
sessment that Thanos has a potentially valuable 
role to play in Z.P.'s life. That role, however, 
need not be as the primary father figure. 
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While the Pearsons' marriage may be long-
dissolved, we must give some weight to the 
fact that the Pearsons attempted to save 
their marriage, and that Father's intent and 
ability to raise Z.P. as his own were signifi-
cant factors in that decision. Most signifi-
cantly, however, an attack on Z.P.'s paternity 
at this point would be disruptive of Z.P.'s 
strong paternal relationship with Father, a 
relationship that renders Thanos's challenge 
unnecessary from Z.P.'s perspective. Under 
these circumstances, Thanos does not have 
Schoolcraft standing, and the trial court 
erred in allowing him to intervene. 
11 34 We analogize Thanos's status to that 
of an unmarried father seeking to establish 
parental rights to his child in the face of the 
mother's intent to have the child adopted. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2). Sec-
tion 78-30-4.14(2) sets out various require-
ments that an unmarried biological father9 
must comply with in order to establish his 
paternity. See id. When the adoption in-
volves a child under six months of age, sec-
tion 78-30-4.14(2) establishes specific acts, 
including initiating a paternity action, that 
the father must take prior to the mother 
executing her consent to the adoption. See 
id. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b). The mother's consent 
to adoption can be executed as little as twen-
ty-four hours after the child's birth. See id. 
§ 78-30-4.19 (2002). A father who fails to 
comply with the requirements of section 78-
30-14(2) has no standing to object to the 
adoption and permanently loses his parental 
rights to the child. See id. § 78-30-4.14(5); 
In re adoption of B.B.D., 1999 UT 70,1111 10-
12, 984 P.2d 967 ("Under Utah law, 'an un-
married biological father has an inchoate in-
terest that acquires constitutional protection 
only when he demonstrates a timely and full 
commitment to the responsibilities of parent-
hood, both during pregnancy and upon the 
child's birth.'") (quoting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-30-4.12(2)(e) (1996)). 
9. "Unmarried biological father" for purposes of 
Utah Code section 78-30-4.14(2) means a man 
not married to the child's mother, without regard 
to whether the man is married to another. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.11 (2002) (repealed 
2005) (defining "unmarried biological father"); 
id. § 78-30-1.1 (5) (Supp.2005) (same). 
[7, 8] 11 35 By holding Thanos to a simi-
lar, if somewhat more generous, standard, we 
recognize that a husband is presumed to be 
the legal father of a child born into his 
marriage. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-
17.2(2) (Supp.2005). In the vast majority of 
marital births, the husband is also the natu-
ral, biological father of the child. However, 
in the hopefully rare instance where a child 
born into a marriage is fathered by another 
man, the husband is nevertheless deemed the 
father of the child, with all concomitant 
rights and responsibilities, unless and until 
his paternity is successfully challenged under 
the Utah Uniform Parentage Act. See id. 
§§ 78-45g-101 to -902 (Supp.2005); id. 
§ 30-1-17.2(4) ("A presumption of paternity 
established under this section may only be 
rebutted in accordance with Section 78-45g-
607."). Essentially, an illegitimate child born 
into a marriage is immediately subject to a 
de facto adoption by the mother's husband. 
We see no reason why a man who chooses to 
procreate with the wife of another should be 
granted significant latitude to challenge the 
husband's de facto adoption, while one who 
fails to timely establish his paternity of a 
child born to an unmarried woman is perma-
nently barred from doing so upon the moth-
er's mere consent to the child's adoption. 
1136 Like any other unmarried father who 
fails to perfect his inchoate parental rights, 
Thanos lost his standing to contest Z.P.'s 
paternity sometime during the early months 
of Z.P.'s life. Despite the evolving circum-
stances of this case, we conclude that since 
that time Thanos has not met, and to our 
knowledge still does not meet, the School-
craft factors.10 Accordingly, the trial court 
erred in granting Thanos's January 2001 mo-
tion to intervene and his subsequent motion 
for summary judgment establishing his pa-
ternity of Z.P. 
II. Z.P.'s Paternity and Custody 
11 37 Our determination that it was error to 
allow Thanos to intervene in the Pearsons' 
10. We express no opinion on the separate ques-
tion of whether Schoolcraft standing, once lost, 
can ever be regained due to changed circum-
stances. 
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divorce action has inescapable consequences Schoolcraft standing. Accordingly, the pre-
for the trial court's paternity and custody sumption of Father's legitimate parentage of 
orders. With Thanos improperly joined in Z.P. remains unrebutted, and Father re-
this litigation, the trial court's consideration mains the legal parent of Z.P. The trial 
of Thanos's motion for summary judgment to court's supplemental decree of divorce, as 
establish paternity, and the genetic evidence well as any other order entered below, is 
in support thereof, was error. And, of reversed to the extent that it conflicts with 
course, the court's May 2003 order granting Father's legal status as Z.P.'s parent or was 
Thanos's summary judgment on the issue of premised on Thanos's paternity. This mat-
his fatherhood of Z.P. was also erroneous ter is remanded for further proceedings con-
ancl is reversed. sistent with this opinion. 
1138 With Thanos and all of his various 
pleadings and evidence out of the litigation, 
Father remains the presumed and legal fa-
ther of Z.P. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-
17.2(2). Accordingly, the trial court erred in 
applying the parental presumption in favor of 
Mother11 and against Father in making its 
ultimate custody decision regarding Z.P. Oth-
er aspects of the trial court's supplemental 
decree of divorce also rely, explicitly or im-
plicitly, on Thanos's paternity of Z.P., and 
these aspects of the final order are also 
erroneous and must be revisited as appropri-
ate. 
1139 We reverse the trial court's orders 
below to the extent that they rely on Tha-
nos's paternity of Z.P., and remand this mat-
ter to the trial court for the issuance of a new 
custody order, taking into account Father's 
legal paternity of Z.P. 
CONCLUSION 
11 40 Thanos should not have been allowed 
to intervene in this matter clue to a lack of 
11. We recognize that Mother asserted Father's 
non-paternity of Z.P. in her answer and in a 
simultaneous motion to show cause, and that she 
could have litigated Z.P.'s paternity on identical 
evidence in Thanos's absence. Regardless of this 
possibility, Z.P.'s paternity was actually litigated 
almost exclusively between Father and Thanos, 
an improper party. We rule today solely on the 
issues before us, and neither Mother nor Thanos 
argue on appeal that Mother's pleadings provide 
an independent ground to affirm the trial court's 
paternity finding. 
More importantly, for all of the reasons set 
forth in this opinion, Mother would also appear 
to be barred from challenging Z.P.'s paternity on 
the facts and posture of this case. She loo would 
lack Schoolcraft standing, see In re J.W.F., 799 
P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1990), and her actions prior 
to the initiation of divorce proceedings might 
support a determination thai her challenge was 
11 41 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. 
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge 
and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
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Background: Following her convictions 
on her pleas of guilty to three counts of 
barred by equitable estoppel. See Dahl Inv. Co. 
v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391,11 14, 101 P.3d 830 
(listing elements of equitable estoppel); see also 
Kristen D. v. Stephen D., 280 A.D.2d 717, 719 
N.Y.S.2d 771, 772-73 (2001) ("Courts have long 
recognized the availability of the doctrine of eq-
uitable estoppel as a defense in a paternity pro-
ceeding." (citations omitted)); Richard W. v. Ro-
berta Y., 240 A.D.2d 812, 658 N.Y.S.2d 506 
(1997) (applying equitable estoppel principles to 
bar a paternity challenge). For the same rea-
sons, Father would also appear to be barred 
from seeking to disestablish paternity of Z.P. 
should he ever choose to do so. 
We express no opinion on whether Z.P. him-
self, the state of Utah, or any other person or 
entity could ever challenge Father's paternity, or 
the circumstances that might permit such a chal-
lenge. 
